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rebalancing. We also find that firm’s stock returns induce some corporate issuing 
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Capital structure decisions are enigmatic. There is a surprising lack of consensus even 
about the basic empirical facts regarding capital structure decisions. This led Myers 
(1984) to coin the phrase “the capital structure puzzle” and raised a number of 
unanswered questions. While much research has been conducted since 1984, many of 
Myers’ questions remain unresolved. In an influential and controversial paper, Welch 
(2004) provides US evidence on Myers questions. For instance, Welch (2004) finds that 
firms are basically inert and their capital structure changes are mainly caused by their 
stock returns. Moreover, he documents that firms do not issue debt or equity to counter 
the effect of stock returns on their capital structure. Welch also shows that after 
controlling for stock return effects, many previously used proxies play a minor role in 
explaining capital structure dynamics. But how general is this so-called inertia theory? 
Are the Welch results general or are they unique to a US institutional setting? Our main 
objective in this paper is to examine whether stock returns are an important factor in 
firms capital structure choices in a different market to the US, namely Oman. 
 There are several institutional factors that differentiate the US from Oman. First, 
in Oman banks play a pivotal role in financing firms listed on the Muscat Securities 
Market (MSM), whereas US firms rely more on the public debt market. Second, due to 
the simplicity of the tax system, Oman provides an “interesting laboratory” to test 
financial theories. In Oman there are neither personal income taxes nor taxes on 
investment income such as dividends and capital gains. Specifically firms are taxed at a 
flat rate of 12% and individuals are not taxed at all.  
Our results show that Omani firms have high leverage ratios and the main source of 
debt is short-term bank financing. The limited bond market leaves room for banks to 
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play an important role in financing Omani firms. Banks mainly provide short-term loans 
and this explains the high reliance of Omani firms on short-term borrowing. 
We also find robust evidence that stock price changes have a strong and primary 
effect on observed market-based debt ratios. Firms’ capital structures seem to move in 
line with that mechanistically induced by their stock returns. We also find that firms 
show some tendency to revert to their previous debt ratios. However, the impact of stock 
returns dominates the effects of readjustment. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the data and 
presents the measures that we construct to estimate the impact of stock returns on capital 
structure dynamics. Section III develops the regression specification, presents and 
examines the estimation results. Section IV concludes the paper. 
II. Data and Methodology 
A. Data 
The data for this study are taken from “Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed 
Companies” published by the MSM. The MSM collects annual financial statements and 
stock price data for all firms listed on MSM. The MSM maintains a website that 
provides information and financial data related to the performance of listed firms. Each 
year MSM publishes a book “Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed Companies” which 
contains accounting information from financial statements as well as stock return and 
ownership structure data. We complement the data from the MSM Guide with the MSM 
index which we obtain from the MSM. 
The data set comprise all publicly traded firms listed on the MSM in the four 
industry sectors that comprise the MSM namely, financial and banking sector, service 
sector, industry sector, and insurance sector. These sectors contain firms from various 
industries including hotels, poultry, leasing, fisheries, oil, agriculture, energy, power, 
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aviation, banks, investment firms, and manufacturing firms. The data are time series 
cross-sectional variables which are collected over the entire life of the MSM from 1989 
to 2003. 
Any observations with missing data for the book value of debt, and/or market value 
of equity are deleted because these variables are required to calculate our dependent and 
independent variables. Because our regression specification includes lagged variables, 
we also exclude any firm with fewer than two consecutive years of data. The number of 
firms included in the study changes from one year to another, with a range from 60 to 
142. The final data set is an unbalanced panel containing 1,263 firm-year observations. 
B. Empirical Model 
Our research question is whether variation in market leverage ratio is caused primarily 
by stock returns or deliberate managerial choices to adjust to their past target debt ratios. 
The basic empirical model is a time series cross sectional regression of firms’ debt ratios 
against the lagged market leverage ratio and the stock return induced changes in market 
value of equity. This estimating equation extends the model used by Welch (2004) to 
Oman. As with previous studies, the dependent variable in our regressions is market 
leverage ratio or as Welch calls it the Actual Debt Ratio (ADRt). We define accounting 
measures in accordance with Welch (2004). Specifically, ADR is defined as the ratio of 









          (1) 
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where Dt is the sum of current liabilities and long-term liabilities at time t and Et is the 
market value of equity at time t (computed as the number of outstanding shares 
multiplied by the market price). As in Welch (2004), our explanatory variables are the 
lagged ADR and the IDRt,t+k.  IDRt,t+k is the implied debt ratio that results if the firm 
does not adjust its leverage, i.e., it neither issues nor retires debt or equity. It is 
constructed to measure the extent to which market leverage ratios are expected to 
change in response to stock returns. By construction, IDR moves mechanistically with 
stock returns, and not with managerial capital structure decisions. Consistent with 












,         (2) 
where Dt and Et are as defined above, xt,t+k is the stock return from t to t+k net of any 
dividend, t  is a random error, and k is the horizon measured in years.  
Hence, the basic regression equation in Welch (2004) is: 
tktttkt IDRADRADR   ,210        (3) 
As in Welch (2004), perfect readjustment implies that 0,1 21   , while perfect 
inertia suggests 1,0 21   . As robustness checks, we also perform the analysis 
separately on short-term debt, long-term debt, and bank debt. 
Under the hypothesis of optimizing behavior and zero adjustment costs, the 
readjustment hypothesis reflects a target that managers wish to achieve each period. On 
the other hand, the inertia (non-readjustment) hypothesis implies that any change in 
leverage between t and t+k is due to the stock return over the period. We estimate 
equation (3) twice, with and without an intercept. When we include the intercept 0 , it 
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captures a constant target debt ratio. If firms manage their capital structure to maximize 
the advantage of debt for the shareholders, then the coefficient on ADR should be unity. 
On the other hand, if debt ratios are driven mechanistically by stock returns, then the 
coefficient on IDR should be unity. 
Since our focus is on the dynamics of a firm’s capital structure choice, we express 
the capital structure adjustment in equation (2) as follows. Leverage changes with new 
debt issues, debt retirements, coupon payments, and debt value changes. As a result, 
corporate debt can be expressed as: 
ktttkt TDNIDD   ,         (4) 
where TDNI stands for total debt net issuing activity. As in Welch (2004), we define 
TDNI as the difference in total debt value between t+k and t. Similarly, corporate equity 
changes with stock returns (net of dividends), and new equity issues net of equity 
repurchases. Consequently, corporate equity can be expressed as: 
kttktttkt ENIxEE   ,, )1.(        (5) 
where ENI reflects a firm’s net equity issuing and stock repurchasing activity. ENI is 
then defined as the difference in total equity value between t+k and t without return and 

























   (6) 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of basic variables after modifications to address 
outliers as follows. We trim the upper and lower two percentile of each variable’s 
distribution in the normalized series. Using these criteria, we identify 1,212 firm-year 
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observations for the one-year regression and 612 for the 5-year regressions, covering 
corporate financing behaviour from 1989 to 2003. 
On average, Omani companies have a total accounting assets of RO 40 million, with 
around 47% of the assets being short-term.
1
 These assets are employed to earn an 
average RO 8.1 million in revenue. The mean market value of sample firms is about 
1.33 times accounting assets. However, the median market value is much smaller than 
the book value of assets. Similarly, the median market value is considerably smaller 
than the mean market value. The actual debt ratio is around 48%, financed mostly 
through bank loans.
2
 Short-term debt exceeds long-term debt ratio during the period 
under investigation. The standard deviation for short-term debt ratio similarly exceeds 
that for long-term debt. 
The summary statistics of Table 1 show the importance of the dynamic components 
of debt ratios. During the period of study, the average sample firm achieves stock return 
of around 1.5% and pay out 0.9% in dividends. This is significantly lower than the 8.8% 
return reported in Welch (2004) for US firms. A difference also exists for the stock price 
induced capitalization change which is about 0.1% in Oman compared to 7.0% in the 
US. However, a different pattern exists for issuing activity in Oman where Omani firms 
seem to issue more debt and equity than firms in the US. On average, Omani firms issue 
approximately 6.6% (3.7% for the US) in debt and 6.3% (2.4% for the US) in equity. 
This suggests that Omani firms are quite active issuers. As a result, issuing activity may 
                                                 
1
 We did not inflation-adjust book values because the rate of inflation in Oman during the sample period is 
low. 
2
 This is much higher than the 29.8% reported by Welch (2004) for the US.  
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Insert Table 1 here 
To examine whether stock returns can explain debt ratio dynamics, we follow Welch’s 
approach. We first sort all firms by calendar year. Then we sort by sales decile to control 
for size. Then we allocate firms into 10 bins on the basis of their net stock return 
performance where we keep a roughly equal number of firms in each decile. The header 
rows in Table 2 report the median net stock returns for each decile. The first three rows 
report actual capital structure relevance of debt ratio dynamics. The “ending ADR” rows 
suggest that there is a large spread of resulting debt ratios across firms having recently 
experienced different rates of return. Over a one year horizon, the worst stock 
performers end up with an actual debt ratio of 60.4% whereas firms with the best stock 
performance end up with an actual debt ratio of 43%. Over five years, firms that have 
underperformed the MSM by 19% end up with an actual debt ratio of 58.7%, while 
firms that have outperformed the MSM by 75% end up with an actual debt ratio of 
46.1%. 
Insert Table2 here 
The “starting ADR” rows demonstrate that over one year the worst stock performers 
have lower starting debt ratios than the best stock performers. A similar pattern is 
exhibited over the 5-year horizon. This suggests that there is a correlation between debt 
ratios and stock performance. 
                                                 
3
 We found that firms did try to offset the mechanistic effect of stock return surprises but did so slowly. 
Results are not reported but available on request. 
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The “implied IDR” rows show the impact of stock returns on starting debt ratios. Over 
one year, firms that have underperformed the MSM end up with higher implied debt 
ratio relative to firms that have outperformed the stock market. However, the opposite 
pattern appears in the 5-year horizon. This means that over one year firms with poor 
stock performance have high implied debt ratios which are then reversed in the 5-year 
horizon. Data rows four to eight present corporate debt issue and dividend activity, 
while the ninth row reports equity growth, all scaled by firm size. The results indicate 
that the majority of firms are quite active with respect to their capital structures. Over 
one year, firms respond to poor stock performance with more equity issuing activity and 
to good performance with more debt issuing activity.
4
 This is opposite to what Welch 
reports for the US. However, the relationship is not clear over the 5-year horizon in 
terms of debt issuing. Over five years, firms issue less equity regardless of stock return 
performance. The seventh row shows a negative relationship between stock performance 
and “activist equity expansion” over an annual horizon. This relationship disappears 
over the 5-year horizon where equity expansion contracts regardless of stock returns. 
The eighth row investigates whether firms intentionally expand or contract in response 
to stock return performance. Over both annual and 5-year horizons, firms appear to 
contract regardless of stock return performance. However, this contraction is larger for 
firms with good stock performance compared to firms with poor performance over a 
five year period. As an exception, the best decile of stock price performers do engage in 
some active expansion, approximately, 45.8% of their firm value. This suggests that 
firms do take countermeasures to offset the impact of stock return surprises. The last 
                                                 
4
 This implies that firms in our sample do try to counteract the mechanical influence of stock returns. 
However, the relationship is not strong. See also footnote (3). 
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row in Table 2 shows a positive association between induced equity growth and stock 
performance over both annual and 5-year horizon. For instance, firms with good stock 
performance have more stock return induced equity growth compared to firms with poor 
stock performance. 
In summary, most MSM firms are quite active in their capital structure decisions. 
Firms make quite frequent approaches to the public and private financial markets. Our 
results show that firm’s stock returns induce some corporate issuing activity and it 
seems that managers use issuing activity to counteract some of the mechanistic effect of 
stock returns. Stock return induced equity growth moves in tandem with stock return 
performance. 
III. Estimation Results 
Table 3 presents the empirical results computed using the basic regression equation (3). 
To avoid overstating significance levels by pooling the data over time, we employ the 
Fama and MacBeth (F-M) (1973) regression approach. Under this methodology, we first 
run yearly cross sectional regressions. We then report the mean coefficient estimates 
across time and use the time series standard deviation of the slopes in the year-by-year 
regressions to compute standard errors. The main advantage of this approach is that it 
circumvents the problems caused by heteroscedasticity and correlation of residuals 
across firms (Lipson and Mortal (2008)). Fama and French (2002, p. 3) describe F-M as 
“a simple way to obtain robust standard errors that capture whatever contributes to the 
precision of the average slopes”. Another advantage of this approach is that it enables us 
to have a large number of data points. This increases the precision of the slopes and 
reduces their year-by-year volatility (Fama and French (1998)). However, as Fama and 
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French (1998) note, this approach suffers from the problem that the sample 
autocorrelation of the slopes is imprecise. They account for the autocorrelation of the 
regression slopes by requiring a t-statistic of around three to infer reliability. In this 
study, we closely follow this approach. We are also concerned that the regressions may 





percentile for variables with extreme values, consistent with Welch (2004). 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results without a constant, and thus does not allow for 
a constant target debt ratio. For the one year horizon, all panels show that the IDRt,t+k 
better explains the predicted ADRt+k than does the lagged ADRt. The coefficients on 
IDRt,t+k are in the range of 50% to 70%, whereas the range for ADRt is 26% to 41%. 
This suggests that a large fraction of the time variation in the level of leverage stems 
from movements in the stock returns. Over one year, an average firm allows its debt 
ratio to drift by around 62% with stock returns. The average firm show some tendency 
to move back towards its past debt ratio. Still, the influence of stock returns through 
IDR dominates the effects of readjustments. Over all horizons, the coefficient on ADR 
is about half the size of the IDR coefficient, suggesting that the impact of stock returns 
is twice as large as the effects of readjustments. Now turning to the diagnostics of the 
regression estimates, the adjusted R
2
 is strong in all cases. However, it generally exhibits 
an inverse relation with the model horizon. The adjusted R
2
 is 93% for the 1-year 
regression, while it is 88%, 85.5%, 82% and 84% for the two years, three years, four 
years, and five years, respectively. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Nevertheless, if we compare our results with those of Welch we see that the impact 
of stock returns in Oman is much less than that for the US. In a similar vein, Omani 
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firms are more inclined to adjust their capital structure to their old debt ratios relative to 
firms in the US. 
Panel B of Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (3) including an intercept. 
This panel demonstrates similar results to the results obtained in Panel A. The 
coefficients on ADR suggest that firms have some tendency to revert to their old debt 
ratios, though the inclusion of the constant reduces the estimated ADR coefficients 
relative to Panel A. However, the coefficients on IDR still exert considerably more 
influence on firms’ debt ratios than does ADR. Additionally, the intercepts are relatively 
similar in magnitude and exhibit a positive association with the model horizon. This 
implies that firms show marginal increases in debt ratios over the sample period. In 
summary, all panels show that the IDRt,t+k lines up better with the predicted ADRt+k than 
does the lagged ADRt. This suggests that a large fraction of the time variation in the 
level of leverage stems from movements in the stock returns, as opposed to active 
financial management. This does not mean that firms do not try to rebalance. In fact, 
firms in our sample show some tendency to return to their old debt ratios, and this 
tendency is more pronounced for Oman that it is for US firms. However, the impact of 
stock returns dominates the effects of adjustments. 
IV. Conclusion 
We examine whether capital structure changes are driven by stock price movements for 
Omani companies listed on MSM. Using data for Oman provides several advantages. 
First, the data avoid the complexity of tax systems faced by previous studies, and as a 
result may help us to provide clearer results on the importance of debt in financing firms 
in a personal tax free environment. Second, Oman has unique financing arrangements 
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that are characterized by high leverage and high reliance on bank debt, which should 
alleviates the agency problems by forcing managers to pay out the firm’s free cash flow.  
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find strong evidence that equity price 
shocks have a primary effect on corporate capital structure dynamics. Second, the 
average firm in our sample shows some tendency to rebalance their capital structure in 
response to shocks in the market value of equity. However, stock returns exert more 
influence on the market leverage ratio compared to the effects of rebalancing.  
There are some important differences between the findings of this study and Welch 
(2004). First, the impact of stock returns is less pronounced compared to the US. 
Second, Omani firms have a higher inclination to readjust their capital structure. Third, 
in contrast to Welch, we find short-term debt issuing activity is the most capital 
structure relevant corporate activity. Our conclusion is that stock price effects are more 
important in explaining leverage ratios than several factors previously identified in the 
capital structure literature. 
In sum, the empirical results highlight the distinctive features of the Omani business 
environment and could therefore be of particular value for policy makers. For example, 
the apparent narrow choice over sources of finance - primary bank loans - for corporate 
investment should be of interest to policy makers as expansion of these sources may 
contribute to economic growth. Second, the limited size of bond market in Oman 
constrains firms’ choices over sources of financing, forcing them to take loans from 
banks. The development of a market for corporate bonds would give firms more room in 
choosing sources of financing. Thus polices that are concerned with the development of 
the bond market may need to be considered if firms are to be encouraged to optimize 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics 












ADRt Actual Debt Ratio 48.1 49.0 26.3    
IDRt,t+k Implied Debt Ratio 47.0 48.0 26.8 42.2 39.7 24.8 
ADR
CL
 Actual Debt Ratio; Current Liabilities Only 29.5 24.6 21.7    
ADR
LTL
 Actual Debt Ratio: Long-term Liabilities Only 18.6 13.4 18.9    
ADR 
BL
 Actual Debt Ratio:  Bank Loan Only 36.5 20.9 43.0    
CA Amount of Current Assets in (million Omani Rial
5
) 19.20 2.32 144.10    
LTA Amount of Long-term Assets in (million Omani Rial) 21.33 2.49 97.05    
Et +Dt Market values in (million Omani Rial) 53.91 8.32 387.63    
Rev Revenue in (million Omani Rial) 8.11 2.41 20.33    
  Normalized by Market Value and Winsorized       
          
TDNIt,t+k Net Debt Issuing 6.6 3.0 16.0 5.3 12.3 60.8 
ENIt,t+k Net Equity Issuing w/o Dividends 6.3 0.0 15.2 -10.6 4.5 88.5 
TDNIt,t+k +ENIt,t+k Debt and Equity Issuing 14.2 4.6 32.4 -9.7 27.5 140.8 
Divt,t+k = (rt,t+k – xt,t+k ).Et Dividends 0.9 0.0 1.7 2.2 0.8 4.0 
ENIt,t+k –Divt,t+k Activist Equity Expansion 5.0 0.0 15.8 -13.0 3.3 90.4 
TDNIt,t+k +ENIt,t+k –Divt,t+k Activist Total Expansion 12.7 3.5 33.1 -12.2 24.8 143.1 
rt,t+k . Et Total Return in Omani Rial 1.5 0.0 13.5 2.0 1.6 13.9 
Xt,t+k..Et Induced Equity Growth 0.1 0.01 12.7 4.4 2.8 14.2 
The sample consists of all publicly listed firms at the MSM from 1989 to 2003. Firm years with missing data on book value of debt or market value of equity are 
excluded. There are 1,212 firm-year observations in the one-year panel and 612 firm-year observations in the five-year panel. Firms are normalized by firm value 










                                                 
5
 Omani Rial is worth around $2.6. 
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TABLE 2. Corporate activity, equity growth, and capital structure, classified by stock returns (year-adjusted and sales adjusted) 
Panel A: Sort by Calendar Year, Sales, One Year Net Stock Returns. 
Sort Criterion, Net Return (t, t+1) -63 -30 -16 -6 -1 0 7 21 45 198 
Ending ADRt+1 60.4 50.2 48.1 49.7 49.7 55.4 45.0 50.4 42.1 43.0 
Starting ADRt 48.5 43.5 42.9 48.2 49.0 53.2 42.9 50.6 44.8 57.1 
Return Induced IDRt,t+1 67.2 50.2 46.0 49.5 48.8 52.4 41.7 47.3 38.4 38.6 
Net Debt Issuing, TDNI t,t+1 -80.3 -0.4 2.1 0.0 -5.2 3.6 -1.2 0.5 6.2 3.4 
Net Equity Issuing, ENI t,t+1 3.6 2.2 -1.9 -3.2 0.2 -0.2 23.3 -0.7 0.3 -17.6 
Dividends, DIV t,t+1 1.0 1.4 3.9 1.3 1.1 1.8 3.6 2.8 4.1 2.3 
Activist Equity Expansion (ENI-DIV) 2.6 0.9 -5.8 -4.5 -0.9 -2.0 -26.9 -3.5 -3.8 -19.9 
Activist Expansion (TDNI+ENI-DIV) -77.7 0.5 -3.7 -4.5 -6.1 1.7 -28.1 -3.0 2.4 -16.5 
Induced Equity Growth, X t,t+1 -80.1 -20.1 -9.8 -3.6 -0.3 0.1 4.9 8.7 17.7 44.9 
Panel B: Sort by Calendar Year, Sales, 5-Year Net Stock Returns. 
Sort Criterion, Net Return (t, t+5) -19 -9 -3 0 5 10 15 23 36 75 
Ending ADRt+5 58.7 53.4 46.9 51.3 48.6 45.6 45.7 46.7 50.9 46.1 
Starting ADRt 35.6 32.5 36.2 43.9 41.3 46.7 42.9 45.8 57.6 58.4 
Return Induced IDRt,t+5 39.9 34.1 36.8 43.8 40.4 44.9 40.2 42.3 52.0 48.2 
Net Debt Issuing, TDNI t,t+5 -23.0 5.3 9.7 7.7 6.0 -1.2 11.6 -17.0 -42.4 -2.9 
Net Equity Issuing, ENI t,t+5 -98.6 -70.7 -43.8 -18.4 -5.7 9.5 0.4 -71.2 -145.8 52.4 
Dividends, DIV t,t+5 5.0 2.5 2.4 3.7 2.3 2.7 2.3 1.7 10.9 3.8 
Activist Equity Expansion (ENI-DIV) -103.6 -73.2 -46.2 -22.1 -8.0 6.8 -1.9 -72.9 -156.7 48.6 
Activist Expansion (TDNI+ENI-DIV) -126.6 -67.8 -36.5 -14.5 -2.0 5.6 9.8 -89.9 -199.1 45.8 
Induced Equity Growth, X t,t+5 -32.6 -9.9 -3.4 0.4 2.7 4.5 6.6 14.9 24.5 39.6 
All variables are medians and are expressed in percentages. Firms are sorted first by year, then by sales decile, and then allocated to deciles based on their stock return 
rank (within each group of 10 firms). In each panel, the 4
th
 rows through the 9
th
 rows are normalized by firm size. Other rows are not normalized. In panel A, there are 
between 100 and 120 observations per decile; in panel B, between 50 and 65. 
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TABLE 3. Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting ADRt+k with ADRt and IDRt,t+k 
Panel A: Without Intercept  
Horizon k con. ADRt IDRt,t+k s.e.c s.e.ADR s.e.IDR Adjusted R
2
 (%) N T 
1 Year F-M  26.3 62.4  3.91 3.90 93.0 1212 14 
2 Year F-M  37.9 61.5  5.66 5.67 88.0 1049 13 
3 Year F-M  34.7 62.4  6.74 6.69 85.5 896 12 
4 Year F-M  40.9 50.7  7.73 7.70 82.0 750 11 
5 Year F-M  28.5 69.3  4.98 4.86 84.0 612 10 
Panel B: With Intercept 
Horizon k  ADRt IDRt,t+k  s.e.ADR s.e.IDR Adjusted R
2
 (%) N T 
1 Year F-M 9.2 15.0 68.3 0.84 3.86 3.76 71.7 1212 14 
2 Year F-M 15.3 18.8 53.6 1.18 5.44 5.26 53.3 1049 13 
3 Year F-M 18.9 19.1 46.4 1.40 6.30 6.13 44.7 896 12 
4 Year F-M 24.0 16.4 41.2 1.61 7.02 6.78 35.3 750 11 
5 Year F-M 21.1 13.4 48.3 1.77 4.70 4.66 37.5 612 10 
The sample comprises all publicly listed firms at the MSM between 1989-2003. The table presents the results of annual cross-sectional regressions explaining firms’ debt ratios 
(debt dividend by debt plus market value of equity) with the implied debt ratio IDR (where the lagged market value of equity is grossed up by the raw stock return over the period 
k) and the firms own lagged debt ratio ADRt. The cross-sectional regression equation is: .][ ,210 ktktttkt IDRADRADR     A coefficient of 100% on 
ADRt indicates perfect readjustment. On the other hand, a coefficient of 100% on IDRt,t+k indicates perfect lack of readjustment. Fama and MacBeth report means (across years) 
of the regression intercepts and slopes. The adjusted R
2’
s are time-series averages of cross-sectional estimates. N is the number of firm year observations and T is the number of 
cross-sectional regressions. 
 
